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In contemporary Lacanian psychoanalysis, Verhaeghe’s theory of actualpathology/
psychopathology in psychosis and the Millerian idea of “ordinary psychosis” provide
diverging conceptual approaches to psychosis. In this paper, the two approaches to
psychosis are examined with a particular emphasis on “mild psychosis” and compensatory
mechanisms. Despite the shared focus on similar clinical phenomena, particularly body
disturbances, these two theories provide different explanations of psychosis. Verhaeghe’s
theory of psychosis is a synthesis of Lacanian theory, Freud’s idea of actual neurosis
and psychoanalytic attachment concepts. Moreover, these ideas are situated in the
“schizophrenia/paranoia dichotomy” an important heuristic device utilized in clinical
practice with psychosis. In contrast, the Millerian field of ordinary psychosis aims
to broaden the idea of psychosis by reviving the idea of “mild psychosis” and the
different forms of stabilization possible in psychosis. Clinicians adapting the idea of
ordinary psychosis aim to rethink pivotal Lacanian concepts—“untriggered” psychosis
and stabilization—beyond the scope of the schizophrenia/paranoia dichotomy. Although
the idea of ordinary psychosis requires further development, it promise greater utility than
Verhaeghe’s model, as it provides a broader and more nuanced approach to the complex
vicissitudes of triggering and restitution in psychosis.
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INTRODUCTION
In Lacanian psychoanalysis psychosis continues to be an impor-
tant focal point for new theoretical developments driven by clini-
cal experience. Two important new developments have emerged
over the past decade that provide contrasting approaches to
Lacan’s oeuvre and the theorization of psychosis. Paul Verhaeghe,
in On being normal and other disorders:a manual for clini-
cal psychodiagnostics provides a fascinating approach to psy-
chosis through his synthesis of Lacanian psychoanalysis with
Freud’s theory of actual neurosis and psychoanalytic attach-
ment theory research. His theory of psychosis is important as
it addresses forms of psychosis “without symptoms.” That is,
he engages with aspects of psychosis not easily contained by
contemporary psychiatric nosology such as, psychosis without
delusions and hallucinations, untriggered psychosis and body
disturbances such as hypochondriasis. Moreover, he provides
a specific treatment rationale for cases of psychotic distur-
bances that fall roughly into the schizophrenic spectrum. In con-
trast, Jacques-Alain Miller’s engagement with the “later Lacan”
informs his theoretical approach to the emerging field referred
to as “ordinary psychosis.” The term ordinary psychosis pro-
vides an epistemic category—as opposed to a new nosological
entity—for clinicians to address a series of theoretical prob-
lems linked to decompensation and stabilization often encoun-
tered in the treatment of psychosis (Miller, 2009; Grigg, 2011).
Both projects are a response to contemporary clinical phenom-
ena, often referred to as “new symptoms,” and the perceived
limitations to aspects of Freudian and Lacanian theory. Despite
this, these two approaches differ substantially from each other,
and as such, provide significantly different views of psychosis and
the possibilities of treatment. In a recent interview, Verhaeghe
made several criticisms of the field of ordinary psychosis. First,
he thinks that Miller’s idea has “little if anything to do with
psychosis in the classical Lacanian sense” (Verhaeghe, 2011,
p. 20). And second, he believes that the term is likely to cre-
ate confusion for non-psychoanalytically trained clinicians and
is therefore likely to be unhelpful. As such, important theo-
retical and practical debates are at stake between these two
approaches.
The aim of this paper is to develop a clearer sense of the
conceptual divide between Verhaeghe’s theory of psychosis and
the Millerian field of ordinary psychosis. I provide an overview
of these two diverging approaches and indicate the conceptual
advantages of theMillerian idea of ordinary psychosis. I claim that
Verhaeghe’s theory has several limitations. First, there appears to
be conceptual ambiguity in his theorization of foreclosure and
drive regulation in psychosis. Second, the theory of foreclosure,
which underlies Lacan’s idea of psychotic structure, is relatively
under-theorized. And finally, by focusing almost exclusively on
the schizophrenia/paranoia dichotomy, he utilizes a reductive
idea of psychosis. In contrast, I claim that the field of ordinary
psychosis provides a more nuanced engagement with psychosis.
My reading of ordinary psychosis emphasizes how foreclosure
is intimately connected to three practical elements of treatment:
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the onset of psychosis, subsequent triggering events and stabi-
lization 1. I show how the field of ordinary psychosis broadens
the contemporary psychiatric acceptation of psychosis by affirm-
ing that psychotic phenomenology are rich, complex, subtle and
that symptom severity has no necessary connection to the idea
of psychotic structure. Although Verhaeghe would undoubt-
edly be in agreement with this last point, I contend that the
Millerian category of ordinary psychosis provides amore nuanced
account of psychotic phenomena and psychosis. To achieve this,
I begin by summarizing Lacan’s theory of psychotic structure to
anchor the discussion of the differences between Verhaeghe and
Miller.
LACAN’S THEORY OF PSYCHOTIC STRUCTURE
In Lacanian theory, the neurosis/psychosis distinction remains
central to how analysts conceptualize clinical practice 2. While
Lacanian nosology has strong links to modern psychiatry, the
Freudian theory of the unconscious is used to articulate the
different mechanisms underlying neurosis and psychosis 3. For
Lacan, both psychosis and neurosis are situated vis-à-vis the sub-
ject’s relation to the Other and in particular, the signifier known
as the “Name-of-the-Father.” The Name-of-the-Father is asso-
ciated with an array of functions linking the subject with the
Other; these include castration, symbolic identifications, desire,
and the installation of the proper name. Fundamentally, the
Name-of-the-Father is as signifier regulating the unconscious,
in part, through creating a structural limit (i.e., castration) to
the subject’s capacity for drive related jouissance. In neurosis,
the subject’s relation with the Other is mediated by the signi-
fier, the Name-of-the-Father, via symbolic identification. Hence,
different forms of neurosis such as hysteria and obsessional neu-
rosis are constituted by repression, a mechanism driven via the
subject’s identification with the signifier the Name-of-the-Father.
Although foreclosure, like repression, is a form of negation (i.e.,
the subject negates this signifier), they are not the same; they have
significantly different consequences in the formation of psychic
structure.
Lacan asserts that a psychotic structure emerges from the
foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father. Thus, the foreclosure of
the Name-of-the-Father is the central mechanism in psychosis
and differentiates psychosis from neurosis. His classical theory
of psychosis conceptualizes psychic structure by focusing on the
subject’s position in the symbolic order via the Name-of-the-
Father. The mechanism of foreclosure, developed by Lacan from
1I use the term onset when referring to the notion of the first psychotic episode;
in contrast, I use the phrase triggering events when referring to the emergence
of psychotic episodes occurring after the original onset.
2A third clinical structure, perversion, is also utilized in Lacanian theory (Dor,
1997) but will not be discussed here due to its marginal status in the clinical
field (Fink, 1997) and ongoing doubt over its nosological status (Miller, 2009).
3Verhaeghe’s claim that ordinary psychosis will lead to confusion between
psychoanalysts and other mental health professionals is misguided. As Miller
(2009) himself has stated, using the term ordinary psychosis is not an excuse to
ignore themodern psychiatric clinic, rather, the term invites clinicians to reen-
gage with the knowledge obtained by the “masters” of classical psychiatry such
as Kraepelin, Bleuler, de Clérambault and others, in the attempt tomitigate the
reductive idea of psychosis explicated in contemporary psychiatry.
Freud’s texts on psychosis (1911, 1918), is a form of negation that
is contrasted with repression. In neurosis, repression occurs when
signifiers are turned away from consciousness into the uncon-
scious. In psychosis, foreclosure is a unique form of negation
such that the subject never affirms the existence of the signifier,
the Name-of-the-Father. Consequently, this signifier is foreclosed
and is never registered in the subject’s symbolic universe. Instead
of signifiers being repressed, a mechanism that presupposes the
judgment of existence (Lacan, 1953), the foreclosure of the sig-
nifier the Name-of-the-Father leaves a hole in the Other (Lacan,
1958).
In psychosis, the foreclosure of the signifier entails that the
subject may encounter a hole in the symbolic at pivotal junc-
tures in subjective experience. The rupture in the signifying chain
occurs when the subject is unable to signify aspects of their exis-
tence along the axes of metonymy and metaphor. Problems with
metonymy underlie many of the language disturbances encoun-
tered in psychosis such as “loose associations” and a break down
in syntax. Here, the one-to-one linkage between signifiers is inter-
rupted. In contrast, the absence of the paternal metaphor in
psychosis causes the subject’s link to language to differ signifi-
cantly when compared to the neurotic subject. The absence of an
anchoring signifier, the Name-of-the-Father, may produce radical
disturbances to subjectivity, as there is literally no way of rep-
resenting specific aspects of subjective experience. As metaphor
functions to designate the position of the subject in the signify-
ing chain, which is intimately linked to the question of meaning
and identity (Vanheule, 2011), then the absence of the signifier,
the Name-of-the-Father, can have significant consequences; this
is particularly evident in the subject’s relation to sexuality and the
drives. I return to in these points later in this paper.
Lacan’s theory of psychosis utilizes the idea of “unitary
psychosis” by supposing that the mechanism of symbolic fore-
closure is a necessary and sufficient condition for a psychotic
structure. Unitary psychosis is characterized by the claim that
there is only one fundamental mechanism underlying all non-
organic psychosis (Berrios and Beer, 1994), despite significant
variations in symptomatology, and with the recognition that
distinct sub-groups of psychosis—schizophrenia, paranoia, and
melancholy—do exist. This is important to note because for
Lacan, the emphasis on unitary psychosis is augmented by what
classical psychiatry calls the “schizophrenia/paranoia” dichotomy.
In classical psychiatry, the schizophrenia/paranoia distinction
emerged from the clinical observation of symptomatology in psy-
chosis. On the one hand, the schizophrenia/paranoia dichotomy
is a nosological distinction. For example, in schizophrenia psy-
chotic phenomena are often complex and variable; unsystema-
tised delusions, confabulations, hallucinations, social withdrawal,
and a range of disorganized behavior such as vegetative states,
body disturbances and incoherent cognitive processes, may be
encountered (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973; Sadock and Sadock,
2003; Verhaeghe, 2004). In contrast, in paranoid psychosis, a
delusion may be the only overt symptom; and in certain cases,
even this may be subtle and difficult to detect. On the other hand,
the schizophrenia/paranoia dichotomy supposes that psychotic
phenomena have a tendency to evolve from an abstract and dis-
organized state into a systematized form (Meisser, 1981; Hriso,
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2002; Stanghellini, 2009). Thus, clinicians have long observed
the progressive, evolutionary tendency of psychosis; the disor-
ganization inherent to classical schizophrenia symptomatology
has the tendency to evolve into a systematized delusion of the
paranoid type. In these instances, the “deficit” symptoms and dis-
organization of schizophrenia will disappear with the emergence
of systematized delusional phenomena. Freud’s analysis of these
phenomena was groundbreaking as it provided a treatment ori-
entation for analysts working with psychotic patients and remains
a central pillar to the subsequent theorization of psychosis in the
Lacanian field.
In Freud’s (1911) major work on psychosis, the schizophre-
nia/paranoia dichotomy was conceptualized in terms of decom-
pensation and recovery. His engagement with the Schreber case
was significant because he asserted that delusional phenomena
had stabilizing effects when compared to the disorganization of
classical schizophrenia. For Freud, the formation of a delusion
was an attempt at recovery because it correlated with the subject’s
reengagement with the world. In schizophrenia, radical disorga-
nization is painful and the individual is often unable to engage in
the most basic social relations and activity in the world. In con-
trast, in paranoia the formation of a delusion is often linked with
mitigating effects—not only do the classical schizophrenia symp-
toms disappear but the formation of a delusion also correlates
with the subject’s reengagement with others, albeit in a modified
form (Freud, 1911). In Lacan’s classical theory of psychosis artic-
ulated in the 1950s, both the schizophrenia/paranoia dichotomy
and Freud’s thesis of restitution are pivotal to his approach to the
question of psychotic structure. In following Freud’s reasoning,
Lacan states that the distinction between schizophrenia and para-
noia is essential to his own theorization of psychosis4. However,
in Lacan’s classical theory of psychosis, paranoia as opposed to
schizophrenia was the focal point of his work in the 1950s 5.
Through introducing the idea of a “delusional metaphor,” Lacan
transformed the ideas of progressive systematization and restitu-
tion 6. However, an overemphasis on the paranoid spectrum of
psychosis and on Lacan’s account of the mechanisms encountered
in paranoia, has meant that non-delusional forms of stabilization,
particularly in the schizophrenic end of the spectrum, are poorly
understood.
4Lacan states:
I remind you that at the end of the observation on the Schreber case,
which is his major text concerning the psychoses, Freud traces out a
watershed, as it were, between paranoia on the one hand and on the
other everything hewould like, he says, to be called paraphrenia, which
exactly covers the field of the schizophrenias. This is a necessary ref-
erence point for the intelligibility of everything we shall subsequently
have to say—for Freud the field of the psychoses divides in two (Lacan,
1993, p. 4).
5However, Lacan’s comment on the importance of imaginary identification
as a mechanism of stabilization encountered in untriggered schizophrenia,
derived in part from his commentary on Deutsch (1942), was also intro-
duced at this time and remains a significant component in the treatment of
psychosis.
6Vanheule’s (2011) The subject of psychosis: a Lacanian perspective for a
useful discussion of the delusional metaphor and the paternal metaphor.
CASE VIGNETTE
Emphasizing the schizophrenia/paranoia dichotomy entails that
stabilization is viewed primarily in terms of paranoia and the
formation of a delusion. In contrast, clinicians using the term
“ordinary psychosis” have observed that body phenomena may
be linked to the stabilization of an individual in the absence of
a delusion. The second part of this paper explores these themes.
I discuss a case vignette illustrating the centrality of the body
symptoms in the stabilization of psychosis. I use this case as
a starting point for outlining Verhaeghe’s theory of psychosis
that attempts to integrate empirical research with Freudian and
Lacanian theory. I then develop a critique of his position and
introduce important issues linked to the field of ordinary psy-
chosis relating to the ideas of untriggered psychosis, stabilization,
and body symptoms.
In “The use of metonymy in a case of psychosis,” Deffieux
(2000) offers a theory of metonymy as the framework for con-
ceptualizing the symptomatisation in psychosis.
The case of “Murielle” provides insight into how invasive
and painful body phenomena become transformed into a local-
ized symptom that appears to have a stabilizing function. An
important feature of the case concerns the connection between
body phenomena, symptoms and her unique history: specifically,
Murielle’s medical history concerning scoliosis can be traced to
both invasive psychotic phenomena and the emergence of a body
symptom.
Murielle initially presented to a clinic with severe body pains:
wrist and ankle pain and body inflammations traversed her body.
Medical evaluations do not show any organic basis for the phe-
nomena. Murielle’s body pains have a complex aetiology. At age
eleven, she was diagnosed with scoliosis and as part of the treat-
ment she wore a corset to bed every night until the age of eighteen.
Her psychotic symptoms began as a teenager shortly after encoun-
tering her ill father in hospital; she was shocked and overwhelmed
to find her father very weak, in pain and barely conscious when
receiving prostate treatment. Murielle was hospitalized for severe
body pains a few days after visiting her father. Several years later,
she again experienced psychological difficulties after finishing the
medical treatment with the corset: persecutory voices, in the form
of “hearing” thoughts and whispers of other students, emerged
shortly after the cessation of treatment.
Although Deffieux considers the diagnosis of hysterical neu-
rosis and conversion disorder, both he and the treatment team
arrive at the diagnosis of paranoia with hypochondriasis due to
the invasive nature of jouissance upon the body and the existence
of paranoid traits. Deffieux states that the onset of body distur-
bances is clearly linked to her father’s illness and suggests that
the influx of invasive body jouissance at this time correlates with
the breakdown of her image of the father, and can therefore be
theorized in the context of an “undialectised” imaginary identi-
fication between father and daughter. Moreover, he hypothesizes
that vicissitudes of psychotic phenomena are linked to the corset’s
removal; he states that “jouissance, no longer circumscribed by the
corset, found a new localization in theOther, more precisely in the
gaze of the Other” (Deffieux, 2000, p. 153). Here, a clear transi-
tion from body phenomena to a nascent delusional structure that
is expected in paranoia occurs. However, at the beginning of the
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treatment, the invasive jouissance moves from the gaze of the Other
back to the body. In summary, he states that “it is interesting to
note the transition of this mobility of jouissance which moves
from the body fitted up with its train of suffering, to the delu-
sional interpretation of the Other’s gaze and then returning in the
body in the oblique way of hypochondria” (2000, p. 153).
Although Deffieux assumed a diagnosis of psychosis with
a paranoid structure, Murielle’s mode of stabilization was not
through the production of a delusional metaphor. As the invasive
jouissance returned to her four limbs not supported by the corset,
Deffieux suggests the aim of treatment is to reduce the intensity
of “pain from her body and of finding substitutes for the previ-
ous corset” (2000, p. 154). Instead, invasive body jouissance was
mobilized into the elaboration of a body symptom via a signifying
series. Here Deffieux states:
The theoretical guide in this case was fairly simple: we noted,
then followed and accompanied the subject’s metonymic thread,
giving it all its therapeutic value, which was to delimit the inva-
sive jouissance. What was the metonymical series in this case? One
must begin with the ritual of the water basin from when she was
a child, recognize the value of the corset when she was an ado-
lescent, and from that follow the ritual of washing her feet and
hands and which moved on, always following through this series,
to delimiting herself little by little to wetting her feet and then to
wrapping her hands in a damp flannel and her toes in cotton ban-
dages. The last in the chain came to her following a conversation,
through the advice to use a “hydrating cream.” This last minimal
link was nonetheless enough for her. The pain completely disap-
peared, but she retained a peculiar, precautionary way of walking,
as if she were stepping on egg shells (2000, p. 156).
This case provides a useful reference point for discussing both
Verhaeghe’s ideas on psychosis and the field of ordinary psychosis;
while it is in no way “paradigmatic” of ordinary psychosis it raises
issues concerning the onset of psychosis, body disturbances and
non-delusional forms of stabilization. I return to these themes
later in the paper. I now discuss these issues in more detail by
examining Verhaeghe’s theory of psychosis.
VERHAEGHE’S THEORY OF PSYCHOSIS: ACTUALPATHOLOGY
AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
Verhaeghe’s engagement with Lacan’s classical theory of psy-
chosis emphasizes the importance of the schizophrenia/paranoia
dichotomy. However, unlike Lacan, Verhaeghe develops this
dichotomy by drawing on Freud’s theories of symptom forma-
tion in actual neurosis and psychoneurosis and, he also draws
on empirical research in attachment theory. On the one hand,
Freud’s distinction between the actual neuroses and psychoneu-
roses underlies the differing symptomatology in neurosis and
psychosis; on the other, by drawing on theories of mirroring in
attachment theory, he aims to provide a developmental mech-
anism for understanding the aetiology of symptomatology in
schizophrenia and paranoia. In summary, Verhaeghe’s approach
to the schizophrenia/paranoia dichotomy consists of three distinct
theoretical approaches: Lacan’s idea of psychotic structure, Freud’s
theory of symptom formation in actual neurosis and psychoneu-
rosis, and finally, psychoanalytic attachment theory research con-
ducted on mirroring behavior between parent and infant.
Verhaeghe coined the phrase the “actualpathol-
ogy/psychopathology continuum” for examining symptom
formation across the schizophrenia/paranoia dichotomy 7. His
theory of actualpathology is based on Freud’s theory of anxiety
equivalents in the actual neuroses8. Actualpathological states are
essentially anxiety equivalents that correlate with the clinical
phenomena described by Freud in cases of actual neurosis.
The actual neuroses refer to a cluster of clinical phenomena,
in both neurosis and psychosis, where anxiety directly affects
the body: disturbances include migraines, panic attacks, free-
floating anxiety, gastro-intestinal irritation, and other somatic
phenomena9. One useful aspect of Verhaeghe’s theory is that he
utilizes actualpathology in neurosis and psychosis when speaking
about contemporary clinical issues and DSMnosology. For exam-
ple in neurosis, actualpathology may be useful for considering
panic disorder, PTSD, somatization, and borderline personality
disorder (BPD). However, this is not necessarily a simple under-
taking as diagnoses such as BPD, which often include transitory
psychotic states, could be also be viewed in terms of a psychotic
structure and untriggered psychosis (Maleval, 2000) a point I
return to later. Nevertheless, Verhaeghe’s views on actualpathol-
ogy provide a useful framework for considering certain aspect of
DSM-IV-TR diagnosis and contemporary clinical issues.
Freud originally conjectured that clinical phenomena belong-
ing to actual neuroses were linked to the direct manifestations of
anxiety. He used the term “anxiety equivalents” to describe them;
anxiety equivalents emerge when endogenous body excitations
cannot be transformed from a physical state into a psycho-
logical phenomena 10. Anxiety equivalents emerge in the body
7The reader should be informed that Verhaeghe’s actualpathol-
ogy/psychopathology is not restricted to psychosis and is superimposed
on to Lacan’s three clinical structures: neurosis, psychosis, and perversion.
8Verhaeghe (2004) uses the term “the actualpathological position of the sub-
ject” when referring to the clinical phenomena outlined by Freud’s idea of
the actual neuroses; moreover, like Freud, his approach to actualpatholog-
ical states moves across the diagnostic spectrum: neurosis, psychosis, and
perversion. Although my discussion focuses on actualpathological states in
psychosis, the mechanism underlying actualpathology—the failure of the
Other to adequately mirror, and hence, modulate the subject’s endogenous
drive tension—is applicable to neurosis, psychosis, and perversion.
9The DSM-IV-TR’s (2000) Generalized anxiety disorder has its nosological
antecedents in Freud’s theory of the actual neuroses (Tyrer and Baldwin,
2006).
10Freud developed the theory of actual neurosis to address instances where
unconscious processes did not function in the emergence of clinical phenom-
ena. In the Introductory lectures to psychoanalysis he states:
But the symptoms of the “actual” neuroses—intracranial pressure,
sensations of pain, state of irritation in an organ, weakening or inhibi-
tion of a function—have no “sense,” no psychical meaning. They are
not only manifested predominately in the body. . . but they are also
themselves entirely somatic processes, in the generating of which all
the complicated mental mechanisms we have come to know are absent
(Freud, 1916–1917, p. 387).
From one point of view, Freud maintains that somatic phenomena are devoid
of psychological meaning, as the mechanisms of displacement and conden-
sation do not operate in these phenomena. For example, if a headache were
a neurotic conversion symptom then the analysand’s associations, memories
and unconscious fantasies would eventually illuminate the meaning of the
symptom.
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and tend to be directed to a particular region creating vari-
able physiological disturbances to the normal function of the
organ11. The key difference though, between anxiety equivalents
that emerge in the body and psychoneurotic symptoms, such as
hysterical conversion symptoms, is that the latter are formations
of the unconscious while anxiety equivalents are an “abnormal
employment of libido” that are not formed through the mech-
anisms of unconscious displacement and condensation (Freud,
1916, 1917). Thus, anxiety equivalents are literally meaningless as
there are no repressed ideas and chains of associations underlying
the symptom.
Following on from Freud, Verhaeghe claims that the emer-
gence of anxiety equivalents can be traced to the libido and
the drives. However, he modifies Freud’s (1893) theory that
actual neurosis is the result of undischarged libidinal tensions
and instead proposes that the subject’s endogenous drive excita-
tion has not been sufficiently regulated by the Other (Verhaeghe,
2004). For Verhaeghe, actualpathology indicates that in the sub-
ject’s developmental history, the drives were not sufficiently
modulated by the attachment figure. He states,
The causal factor of actualpathology . . . lies in the fact that the
subject’s internal drive excitation is not—or is insufficiently—
answered by the other. The transition from (a) to A through which
the Other supplies an answer and sets the secondary processing
into motion does not occur, with the result that the initial arousal
turns into anxiety and even into separation anxiety (Verhaeghe,
2004, pp. 300–301).
Verhaeghe states that actualpathology is characterized by a failure
of the other to adequately modulate endogenous drive tension,
particularly during infancy. Drive tension refers to the innate
endogenous body tensions requiring regulation; however, due
to innate infantile helplessness, the other is the locus through
which drive tensions are regulated. Verhaeghe draws on Lacan’s
“object a” when describing endogenous drive tensions that the
subject is unable to regulate through symbolization: the object a,
closely linked to Freudian drive theory, the erogenous zones and
Klein’s part object, produces an impasse in symbolization akin to
trauma12. He uses the term “structural trauma” when referring to
the subject’s incapacity to symbolize, and therefore modulate, the
drive tensions; anxiety generated via the subject’s encounter with
the object a constitutes a structural trauma, a universal feature of
psychic reality, and anxiety equivalents develop when the Other
does not adequately regulate this endogenous drive tension13.
11Freud’s theory of the actual neuroses has been particularly influential in
the area of “psychosomatic” theories of illness; see McDougall and Coen
(2000), Aisemberg and Aisenstein (2004); Taylor (2003); Verhaeghe (2004),
and Verhaeghe et al. (2007) for a discussion of these issues.
12See Vanheule (2011) for a good discussion of Lacan’s idea of the object a in
psychosis.
13Verhaeghe explicitly draws on the idea of infantile helplessness and Freud’s
classic description of drives in the Three essays. Here Freud states:
The concept of instinct is thus one of those lying on the fron-
tier between the mental and the physical. The simplest and likeliest
assumption as to the nature of instincts would seem to be that in itself
an instinct is without quality, and, so far as mental life is concerned,
Thus, as the human infant is born into the world in a state
of radical helplessness and is thus dependent on the Other, the
function of regulating endogenous drive tensions depend on the
subject’s relation with the Other. In actualpathology, drive ten-
sions are not sufficiently transformed into psychical states and
therefore remain at the level of the real; if this occurs, anxiety
equivalents predominate in the clinical picture. Moreover, his the-
ory also relies heavily on a developmental paradigm; he states
that attachment figures—the Other—will determine whether the
subject is sufficiently able to regulate the drive14.
In Verhaeghe’s (2004) theory of actualpathology, attachment
figures are primarily responsible for the regulation and modu-
lation of endogenous drive tension. He claims that the subject’s
inability to modulate the drive is understood in terms of a dis-
turbance to the attachment system and specifically, the mirroring
dynamics between the subject and the other. He situates this fail-
ure of the mirroring function using Lacan’s theory of the mirror
stage (other) and the Other15. Verhaeghe states:
To put it in Lacanian terms, something went wrong during the
mirror stage that is, the period where identity formation starts in
combination with drive regulation. It seems as if the contempo-
rary Other—meaning the parents, but also the symbolic order—is
failing more and more in taking on his/her mirroring function.
The result is that the child does not develop a psychological,
meaning a representational way, of handling his drives and the
accompanying arousal. Moreover, identity formation as such is
hampered as well (2007, p. 9).
He argues that actualpathology is characterized by anxiety equiv-
alents, rather than formations of the unconscious, as the attach-
ment figure has failed to produce sufficient signifiers for the
subject to modulate body arousal (Verhaeghe, 2004). However,
the disturbance to the mirroring relation between the subject and
the Other, which constitutes the mechanism underlying actual-
pathology, is elaborated using the dynamics of infant/caregiver
interactions derived from psychoanalytic attachment research
(Fonagy et al., 2002, 2003; Bateman and Fonagy, 2004, 2006).
Verhaeghe contends that a developmental paradigm is
required to conceptualize the transformation of drive tensions
into a representation psychical form. He asserts that ideas about
metallization, particularly those of Fonagy et al. (2002), pro-
vide a theory outlining the mechanism and aetiology of actual
neurosis. He argues that “in light of Freud’s conclusion that, in
actual neuroses, the process of psychic representation is lacking,
is only to be regarded as a measure of the demand made upon the
mind for work. What distinguishes the instincts from one another and
endows them with specific qualities is their relation to their somatic
sources and to their aims (1905, p. 67).
14Verhaeghe (2004) uses the term “the psychopathological position of the
subject” when referring to what Freud (1894) called the “neuro-psychoses of
defense”; this includes hysterical neurosis, obsessional neurosis, anxiety hyste-
ria and paranoia. What these entities have in common is that primary process
mechanisms are active determinants in symptom formation.
15Verhaeghe appears to uses the term the Other to connote both the small
other (i.e., the individuals ego to ego relation with others as such) and the
Other as language and social order.
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attachment theory permits us to assume that actual neuroses
originate from a deficient mirroring” (Verhaeghe et al., 2007,
p. 1335). He claims that contemporary psychoanalytic attachment
theory provides a model for locating the developmental aetiol-
ogy for the actual neuroses using the mirroring dynamics evident
in early infant/caregiver interactions. Thus, the primary mech-
anism informing his theory of actualpathology, which aims to
explain how endogenous drive arousal becomes excessive to the
point of traumatism, is based on a failure in themirroring relation
between the subject and the Other.
Verhaeghe’s theory of actualpathology then is based on the
idea of deviant mirroring styles identified by researchers in psy-
choanalytic attachment theory. He claims that the disturbances to
themirroring relation outlined by Fonagy et al. (2002) result from
the Other’s failure to modulate the subject’s endogenous drives
tension. Here, the primary defense against the drive fails, due to
the way in which “the Other will mirror the tension of the subject
and/or the way the subject interprets this mirroring” (Verhaeghe,
2004, p. 190). This claim is derived from Fonagy et al.’s theory of
“deviant”mirroring styles; they contend that “if the caregiver mir-
rors the baby’s emotions inaccurately or neglects to perform this
function at all, the baby’s feelings will be unlabeled, confusing,
and experienced as unsymbolised and therefore hard to regulate”
(2002, p. 426). As he believes that deviant mirroring styles consti-
tutes the mechanism underlying certain symptom constellations
in psychosis then it will be useful to provide a brief outline of how
these ideas inform his work.
According to Fonagy et al. (2002) “deviant mirroring” styles
encountered in the attachment relationship results in metalliza-
tion deficiencies and affect disregulation. They claim that deficits
in metallization correlate with affect regulation disturbances: if
the capacity for mentalisation is compromised, affective regu-
lation disturbances and other disorders are likely to develop.
According to Fonagy et al. (2002) mentalisation occurs via the
operation of mature ego functions developed from the nurturing
environment of a secure attachment relationship. Mentalisation
refers to preconscious and conscious representation capacities
utilised in negotiating inter-subjective relations and for the reg-
ulation of affect. Mentalisation is linked with the development of
a sense of self; the capacity to attribute intentional states, beliefs,
goals, desires and emotions to the self and the other, is also
a developmental achievement, and it is the emergence of these
capacities that correlates with the capacity for affect regulation.
Affect disregulation occurs when an individual is unable to mod-
ulate emotions through self-soothing: instead, the subject experi-
ences affects as labile, unpredictable and disorganizing. Although
mentalisation deficiencies and affect disregulation emerge when
neglect, abuse, or chronic misattunement are present in the
infant/caregiver dyad, the authors claim that these events can be
theorized in terms of deviant mirroring dynamics. Bateman and
Fonagy (2004) claim that there are at least two types of deviant
mirroring styles and both have potentially traumatizing effects:
Mirroring would be expected to fail if it is either too close to
the infant’s experience or too remote from it. If the mirroring
is too accurate, the perception itself can become a source of
fear, and loses its symbolic potential. If it is absent, not readily
forthcoming, or contaminated with the mother’s own preoccupa-
tion, the process of self-development is profoundly compromised
(2004, p. 35).
In the first example, where the parent’s mirroring is analogous
with the infant’s affect, the mirroring is too realistic due to a
high degree of similarity. Here, the negative affect is categorically
congruent; the parent mirrors the infant’s affect state too realis-
tically and does not “mark” the representation of the affect state.
There are several consequences to this. First, the infant may iden-
tify with the caregiver’s emotional disregulation; consequently,
the infant’s consistent exposure to the caregiver’s negative affect
is both alienating and disorganizing. Second, the infant will not
create secondary representations of its primary affect state, as no
“anchoring” emerges between affect and representation through
the parent’s mirroring. Anchoring refers to the associational link
between secondary representations and the primary affect; here,
a deficiency of self-perception will emerge in conjunction with an
affect regulation disturbance. Third, negative affect will be exter-
nalized onto the other. Finally, realistic mirroring in an unmarked
form escalates the infant’s negative affect leading to traumatism:
the lack of maternal containment and processing of negative
affect escalates the negative affect to the point of dissociation and
splitting of the ego (Fonagy et al., 2002).
In contrast, in the second form of deviant mirroring, where
the mirroring is absent, there is a lack of category congru-
ence between the affect and its secondary representation. In this
instance, the mirroring performed by the caregiver is too dis-
similar from the infant’s primary affect state. There is marked,
but inaccurate, mirroring of infant’s primary affective state.
Mirroring is partially effective; the infant develops secondary
representations anchored to the primary affect state. However,
these representations are incongruent with the affect; therefore,
a distorted sense of the affect states may ensue16.
Verhaeghe draws directly on these theories of “deviant” mir-
roring styles in his approach to certain clinical phenomena in
psychosis. He claims that psychosis, particularly cases featuring
body phenomena without hallucinations and delusions, is char-
acterized as the Other’s failure to modulate the subject’s drive. In
Verhaeghe’s description of this failure, it is clear that Fonagy et al.’s
(2002) first description of deviant mirroring styles—where mir-
roring is too congruent, marking is absent, and negative affects
have increased—underlies his approach. This is significant for
his approach to the treatment of psychosis because Verhaeghe
believes the failure of Other to adequately modulate the subject’s
drive will be repeated in the transference; in actualpathology the
transference will likely be characterized by rejection, guilt, appeal
and refusal in the subject’s relation with the Other (2004, 2007).
For Verhaeghe, the failure of the Other to adequately mirror and
hence modulate the subject’s drive tension produces a structural
trauma in the formation of the psyche. Here Verhaeghe states:
Actualpathology has been characterized as that group of disor-
ders where the subject remains stuck in primary development: the
16Fonagy et al. claim that this will likely create a distorted perception
of the self-state, a distortion that undermines self-development similar to
Winnicott’s notion of the “false self” (2002).
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Other doesn’t answer, or failed to answer sufficiently. As a result,
the initial (un)pleasure and anxiety, together with their somatic
anxiety equivalents, persist in an unelaborated form. The result-
ing disorders center on somatization and anxiety, accompanied by
reactive avoidance behavior. No processing occurs in the repre-
sentational order, hence the absence of a fundamental fantasy and
symptoms (2004, pp. 351–352).
When discussing actualpathology in psychosis, Verhaeghe
claims that endogenous drive tensions make a demand on the
subject and the only way to respond is through anxious preoc-
cupation. He states that body disturbances are most frequently
encountered in the schizophrenia spectrum of psychosis indi-
cating that “the first logical moment is the moment of onset,
namely, the actualpathological confrontation with (a) in the psy-
chotic structure” (2004, p. 445). However, in his synthesis of
actualpathology and psychosis, anxiety equivalents are the focal
point of his discussion of body phenomena. In actualpathol-
ogy in psychosis, the clinical presentation is often characterized
by hypochondriacal phenomena and panic disorder; secondary
symptoms such as hallucinations and delusions may be altogether
absent. For Verhaeghe, hypochondriacal complaints and intru-
sive body phenomena indicate that drive arousal has not been
psychically represented. He claims that hypochondriasis emerges
from the impossibility of psychically representing somatic drive
arousal; in a psychotic structure, the failure of the Other to
adequately modulate the subject’s drive tension governs the emer-
gence of body phenomena such as hypochondriacal symptoms. In
actualpathology, there is no substitution by signifiers and no sym-
bolization; thus, the development of a symptom articulated via a
chain of signifiers is not evident and the disturbance remains in
the form of an anxiety equivalent.
He then advances the idea that the stabilization of disorga-
nizing body phenomenon in schizophrenia is best achieved via
the construction of a delusion; this engenders a level of psychi-
cal organization that uses secondary defenses and a network of
signifiers to bind drive tensions in the form of a delusional con-
struction. Verhaeghe (2004) states that the exploration of the
original “failed” relation between the subject and the Other in the
transference must occur for the subject to construct a delusion.
He states:
In actualpathologies, the primary aim of the treatment is the
restoration or even the installation of the primary relation between
the subject and the Other through the therapeutic relation. It is
this that will enable the subject to build up a secondary elabora-
tion and, through the transferential relation, embed the original
body arousal into signifiers, enabling symptoms to be constructed.
To put it correctly, one must begin with an exploration of the
original relation between the subject and the Other (with empha-
sis on separation anxiety) and on the remaining signifiers that is,
the minimal original inscriptions of the somatic in the Symbolic-
Imaginary order. Rather than subject analysis, the therapeutic goal
here is subject amplification (2004, p. 309).
Verhaeghe’s conceptualization of psychosis and stabilization
recapitulates the schizophrenia/paranoia dichotomy. He advo-
cates that one treats anxiety equivalents encountered in
actualpathology by the elaboration of a delusional construction in
therapy. He calls this process “subject amplification.” Verhaeghe
states that in actualpathology, interpretations have no effect
because there is nothing to interpret –as there is no meaning to
anxiety equivalents, the phenomena do not have a “metaphorical”
structure and therefore a repressed or hidden meaning cannot
be elucidated 17. Disturbances encountered in actualpathology
are anxiety equivalents not substitutive symptom formations;
for Verhaeghe (2004), to interpret actualpathological phenom-
ena as meaningful, which supposes a metaphorical structure, is
technically incorrect and is likely to induce guilt in the subject.
Conversely, subject amplification orientates clinical intervention;
the treatment aim, and the focus of therapeutic intervention, is to
develop the “minimal signifiers marking the body” into the form
of a signifying construction. Through a naming process unique
to the subject’s own articulation of signifiers, the repetition of the
original failed subject/Other relation with a guaranteeing Other
(the therapist) in the transference transforms anxiety inducing
body arousal into symptom formations. Here, the treatment aim
of developing secondary representational processes requires spe-
cific techniques irreducible to interpretations. The therapist needs
to focus on providing a supportive and name-giving relationship
that is oriented to an empathic engagement with the “here-and-
now” (Verhaeghe, 2004). He claims that the first step is the
installation of a primary relation between the subject and the
Other in the context of a secure relation with the Other; the
therapeutic relationship becomes the foundation for building the
secondary representational processes required to manage drive
arousal that was hitherto experienced as overwhelming. The pro-
vision of a secure relation with the Other in transference relation
is the first logical step in the movement toward secondary pro-
cessing of the drive. However, as the subject’s relation to the Other
in the actualpathological position is characterized by a failure to
modulate drive tensions, the therapist’s intervention will likely be
experienced as failure, as never being good enough; in essence, a
testimony to the historical rejection from the Other that will be
necessarily repeated in the transference.
According to Verhaeghe (2004), therapeutic engagement with
psychosis in the actualpathological position necessitates alter-
ations to classical analytic technique. The recapitulation of devel-
opmental history has important consequences for the role that
constructions have in the direction of the treatment; construc-
tions emerge through the mirroring and naming function that
the therapist assumes due to the subject’s experience of devel-
opmental failure with the Other. In this sense, subject amplifi-
cation is the process where signifiers are installed to represent the
original somatic arousal, establishing secondary representational
processes that facilitate the emergence of “classical symptoms”
(Verhaeghe, 2004). This recapitulates Fonagy’s idea of attuned
mirroring linking affect with signifiers evident in the secure
attachment system between parent and infant. In psychosis, the
construction of a delusion entails a distinct shift in the process-
ing of anxiety: anxiety equivalents, localized in the body, are
transformed into signal anxiety taking the form of the delusional
17See Lacan’s The instance of the letter in the unconscious or reason since
Freud for a discussion of the metaphorical structure of the symptom.
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metaphor. Although delusional systems can be persecutory, over
time the subject’s active role in producing a delusional construc-
tion will have a stabilizing function18. For Verhaeghe, the delusion
is not only a form of recovery, but also, an indication for the
direction of treatment in cases of actualpathology and psychosis.
Moreover, once the delusional system has evolved to a point of
relative stability, the invasive jouissance becomes contained and
encapsulated in delusions that are discrete formations that do
not dominate the subject’s life entirely. The emergence of symp-
tom formations from the actualpathological position entails the
progressive development and stabilization of a delusional system.
This trajectory reflects his ideas regarding how psychosis tends to
naturally progress, which emphasizes the schizophrenia/paranoia
dichotomy, and thus to constructing a delusion in the treatment
of psychosis. However, there are a series of problems with his
account.
ACTUALPATHOLOGY AND THE FIELD OF ORDINARY
PSYCHOSIS
In Verhaeghe’s theory of psychosis there appear to be difficulties
distinguishing between the effects of foreclosure from the Other’s
failure to modulate the subject’s drive tension. For example, in
hypochondriasis where body phenomena are predominant, the
impossibility of representing drive arousal with the signifier could
be an effect of foreclosure, rather than the difficulty in modulat-
ing the drive. This is because in Lacan’s theory of psychosis (1958;
1993), the mechanism of foreclosure is linked to disturbances to
phallic signification; although such disturbances have diverging
manifestations, one important feature is the subject’s inability to
represent that is, to signify, fundamental elements of experience
such as sexuality and embodiment (Sauvagnat, 2000; Vanheule,
2011). Thus, although he correctly claims that as the psychotic
subject does not have access to phallic signification, the psychotic
has a significantly different experience of the body and jouissance
when compared to the neurotic: however, his theory of actual-
pathology does not clearly differentiate them. Thus, in arguing
that the “subject’s perplexity is an expression of the impossibil-
ity of answering the drive’s jouissance” (Verhaeghe, 2004, p. 446),
this impossibility could be due, in his approach, to either the
effects of symbolic foreclosure or, to the failure of the Other to
modulate the subject’s drives. Consequently, it is difficult to sepa-
rate the mechanism of deviant mirroring from the foreclosure of
the Name-of-the-Father in his explanation of the failure of the
Other to modulate the subject’s drive. Hence, the inclusion of
deviant mirroring styles to explain mild psychosis remains to be
clarified due to the under-developed theorization of foreclosure
and deviant mirroring styles.
Following from this emphasis on the failure of the other to
modulate the subject’s drive, his description of endogenous drive
arousal in psychosis focuses extensively on anxiety. As a conse-
quence, the effects of foreclosure on the subject are minimized.
Thus, the central problem in psychosis as articulated in Lacanian
theory—the difficulty in regulating jouissance due to foreclosure
of the Name-of-the-Father—is in Verhaeghe’s account, shifted
18The idea here is that that articulation of signifiers will have a pacifying effect
on jouissance.
primarily to anxiety. Although anxiety in psychosis is of impor-
tance (Sauvagnat, 2005), the primacy of symbolic foreclosure,
and its clinical effects, should be paramount; that is to say,
anxiety in psychosis should be oriented to foreclosure and diffi-
culties in regulating jouissance. For example, in hypochondriasis,
although anxiety is clearly evident, the more pertinent issue con-
cerns the subject’s inability to regulate invasive jouissance due to
the absence of the signifier, the Name-of-the-Father. Hence, the
feeling of perplexity that so often accompanies hypochondriacal
phenomena (Sauvagnat, 2000; Porcheret et al., 2008; Stanghellini,
2009) may be attributable to the subject’s inability to create mean-
ing at a specific juncture. This is a significant issue because in
Lacan’s theory of psychosis a complex array of clinical phenomena
may emerge as a consequence of the foreclosure of the Name-of-
the-Father (Miller, 2009), and, in following Freud’s thesis con-
cerning loss and restitution in psychosis, psychotic phenomena
need to be oriented to the question of onset and stabilization.
Verhaeghe does not adequately discuss in detail the three
distinct theories of stabilization in Lacan’s theory of psychosis.
Stabilization in psychosis is pivotal to Lacan’s work and he
approaches this issue from at least three separate angles: imagi-
nary identification, the formation of a delusion, and the sinthome
(Grasser, 1998). Although Verhaeghe briefly mentions the “as-
if” phenomena and the theory of sinthome, both are linked to
the vague notion of a “prodromal” psychotic phase and are not
adequately developed. Moreover, his claim that the theory of
sinthome is virtually equivalent to the construction of a success-
ful symptom in neurosis is also opaque: his discussion is very brief
and the allusion to the sinthome, as being equivalent to the con-
struction of a symptom, is not sufficiently expanded or explained.
Thus, other forms of stabilization, such as for cases with no obvi-
ous onset, are alluded to as a “successful psychosis” but are given
sparse attention.
Finally, another problem in Verhaeghe’s theory of actual-
pathology is that he adopts the position that the construction of a
delusion is the only method to stabilize a subject after the onset of
psychosis. Thus, he privileges the construction of a delusion as the
modus operandi of stabilization and doubts that other forms of
stabilization in psychosis are possible post onset. He states that the
aim of treatment in psychosis is the construction of a systematized
delusion:
The psychotic subject doesn’t have the luxury of a conventional
language and hence of a conventional, shared solution for the real.
This is why the psychotic must create a private solution, namely,
a delusion. That this delusion is the psychotic’s solution—perhaps
even the only possible one—has not been recognized in today’s
approaches (Verhaeghe, 2004, p. 431).
On the one hand, he is right to state that the delusion, as a form
of recovery, has not been sufficiently recognized in contemporary
psychiatric theories of psychosis. On the other, his emphasis of
the schizophrenia/paranoia dichotomy creates a reductive view
of psychosis as the disorganized phase of acute schizophrenia
becomes the basis for theorizing stabilization according to the
formation of a delusional metaphor. His theory of stabiliza-
tion in psychosis aims to transform the body phenomena, often
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encountered in schizophrenia, into paranoia. Thus, although his
conceptualization of this process is unique, it is, nevertheless,
a recapitulation of the schizophrenia/paranoia dichotomy and
Freud’s thesis that the delusion is a form of recovery. Hence, his
theory does not develop anything new in terms of understanding
the different mechanisms of stabilization in psychosis. I now focus
on the field of ordinary psychosis and show how this approach to
psychosis addresses some of the limitations evident in Verhaeghe’s
theory of psychosis.
THE FIELD OF ORDINARY PSYCHOSIS
The term “ordinary psychosis” emerged from a series of discus-
sions on contemporary clinical practice in theWorld Association of
Psychoanalysis. The term, coined byMiller, was first used during a
series of conferences at Angers, Arcachon, and Antibes (Laurent,
2006) 19. The term was invented to provide an opportunity for
clinicians to discuss “rare cases” where the clinical symptomatol-
ogy could not easily be situated in the neurosis/psychosis distinc-
tion. These rare cases did not follow the “typical” presentation of
either a neurosis or a psychosis as the signs and symptoms were
vague and therefore difficult to catalogue. Moreover, the mecha-
nisms of repression and foreclosure underlying Lacan’s theory of
psychic structure in neurosis and psychosis were also difficult to
deduce from the clinical picture (Svolos, 2008). Taking psychosis
as an example, cases were presented where the clinical picture did
not match with the classical symptoms of schizophrenia (cogni-
tive and corporeal disorganization, hallucinations, and language
disturbances) or of paranoia (delusions). In addition, although
some cases were suggestive of psychosis, the absence of a clear
onset of symptoms—a phenomena described by Lacan (1993)
and an idea that gained traction in the way clinicians think about
psychosis—created additional uncertainty. As the meetings con-
tinued it became clear that these rare cases were more common
than first thought; clinicians realized that difficult to classify cases
were being seen on a regular basis. An important result of these
meetings was the reengagement with Lacan’s work on psychosis,
though in a format that went beyond both his classical theory
of psychosis and theorization of paranoia; instead, Lacan’s ideas
on “untriggered psychosis” and the “suppletion” became cen-
tral to further exploration of the category of psychosis, as used
in the Lacanian field. Miller’s theorization of ordinary psychosis
emerges from this context.
Miller’s (2009) comments on ordinary psychosis focuses on
diagnostic uncertainty. For Miller, the clinical problem of diag-
nostic uncertainty, which was an important issue to emerge from
the conferences, should be addressed in the neurosis/psychosis
distinction. His statements on the idea of ordinary psychosis can
be viewed as an attempt to respond to diagnostic uncertainty in
clinical practice. Specifically, his answer to this problem is to make
psychosis a default position and in doing so, it is clear that he aims
to utilize a broad idea of psychosis—whether this moves beyond
Lacan’s classical theory of psychosis is a subject to debate and an
issue I return to later. The trajectory of his argument is worth
noting. First, he states that ordinary psychosis does not denote
19The series of conferences are published as Conversation d’Arcachon,
Convention d’antibes and Conciliabule d’Anger.
a new nosological category, but instead, provides an approach to
theorizing psychosis. He states,
You say “ordinary psychosis” when you do not recognize evident
signs of neurosis, so you are led to say it is a dissimulated psychosis,
it is a veiled psychosis. A psychosis that is difficult to recognize as
such, but which I infer from various small clues. It’s more of an
epistemic category than an objective category. It concerns our way
of knowing it (2009, p. 149).
Second, if the clinician does not recognize a neurotic structure
then they may assume it is a psychotic structure, even if there
are no obvious features of psychosis. This claim is based on the
assumption that neurosis has a definite structure and that clini-
cians will be able to recognize it. He states that neurosis will be
characterized by repetition, the clear evidence of castration, and
the differentiation between the ego, id, and super-ego (2009), and
in the absence of these signs of a neurotic structure, then the ana-
lyst may assume he is dealing with a case of psychosis. Thus, one
retains the neurosis/psychosis distinction, and by the logic of the
“excluded middle,” one is led to conclude psychosis20. The logic
of the excluded middle refers to cases of diagnostic uncertainty.
Miller’s response to this problem is that one should default to psy-
chosis, given that clinicians will recognize neurosis if it is present.
Thus, doubt over the diagnosis entails a diagnosis of psychosis.
Two points need to be made here. First, cases of ordinary psy-
chosis, determined from the absence of neurotic symptoms, may
be cases of “untriggered psychosis” - this is because a psychotic
structure can be assumed to exist despite no obvious psychotic
signs and symptoms. This echoes Lacan’s claim made in Seminar
III that “there is nothing that more closely resembles a neurotic
symptomatology than a prepsychotic symptomatology” (1993,
p. 191). Second, although one might object to Miller on the
grounds that it is not as easy to recognize neurosis as he sug-
gests, the notion of ordinary psychosis also includes instances of
psychosis that have stabilized post-onset.
In debates concerning ordinary psychosis, the question of what
triggers and what stabilizes psychosis is pertinent to cases ranging
from mild to severe. Tom Svolos observes,
the question is, are the times between breaks . . . to be understood
as ordinary psychosis? And if we take a category like schizophre-
nia, do we understand the time between breaks as dormant or
quiet or latent schizophrenia, or do we understand that as ordinary
psychosis? In other words . . . I think we have a specific, restricted
notion of ordinary psychosis . . . the ordinary psychosis of the
banal, where it’s very stable and limited and so forth—but then
ordinary psychosis opens up a more general theory of ordinary psy-
chosis against which we can articulate the specific structure of say,
schizophrenia or paranoia. The utility of the concept is the way
that it’s broadened our ability to conceptualize psychosis and think
about issues of stabilization in ways that didn’t exist in the literature
before (2009, p. 165 emphasis added).
These remarks indicate that there are two approaches to ordinary
psychosis regarding triggering and stabilization. The first con-
cerns cases where stabilization occurs subsequent to an obvious
20See Vanheule (2011) for a slightly different reading on the status of the
neurosis/distinction in Lacan’s later teachings.
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psychotic break. Although severe psychotic features, such as delu-
sions and hallucinations, may appear subsequent to the triggering
of a psychosis for a certain group of psychotics, these symptoms
will often attenuate to the point where no obvious evidence of
psychosis remains. However, as Svolos notes, the periods of sta-
bility between triggering events need to be articulated in terms of
stabilization, as opposed to mere phenomenological descriptions
(residual phase) or the invention of new diagnostic categories
(schizotypal personality disorder)21. The second way of speaking
of ordinary psychosis, referred to as “banal psychosis” or untrig-
gered psychosis, includes cases where no obvious triggering event
has occurred. For Svolos, combining these two perspectives on
ordinary psychosis opens a general notion of psychosis that focuses
on triggering and stabilization. If the idea of ordinary psychosis
is oriented toward these two issues—untriggered psychosis and a
post-onset stabilized psychosis—then triggering and stabilization
emerge as key features to investigate in this field.
As the investigation of ordinary psychosis is focused, in part,
on untriggered psychosis then the idea of “mild” psychosis is
an important feature of this field. Milder forms of psychosis are
devoid of clinical phenomena such as hallucinations, delusions,
mania, and disorganized thought (Laurent, 2006; Svolos, 2008).
In their place, a significant number of clinical phenomena remain
(Miller, 2009), which are poorly understood by clinicians. Before
discussing these issues it must be emphasized that ordinary psy-
chosis has continuity with aspects of classical psychiatry. In one
sense, Miller’s attempts to “broaden” the category of psychosis
vis-à-vis the term ordinary psychosis is, in one sense, merely a
call to return to classical psychiatric concepts. He states:
but once you’ve said that it’s ordinary psychosis, it means it’s a
psychosis, and if it’s a psychosis, it may be subjected to classical
organizational concepts. . .Ordinary psychosis must not be a per-
mission to ignore the clinic. It’s an invitation to go further than
this term (Miller, 2009, pp. 155–156).
For example, Svolos’ discussion of ordinary psychosis explicitly
engages Bleuler’s idea of latent schizophrenia, a psychosis without
obvious or severe positive and negative symptoms; the conjunc-
tion between the two is made as both focus on the idea of mild
psychosis22. However, the important question for him and other
Lacanian theorists using the term ordinary psychosis is whether
mild psychosis is considered to be an “untriggered psychosis” or a
post-onset stabilized psychosis. I return to these issues later in the
paper.
Another parallel between the field of ordinary psychosis and
classical psychiatry coalesces around cenesthetic schizophrenia.
Cenesthetic schizophrenia shows the primacy of body distur-
bances in certain forms of schizophrenia, in which typical
symptoms of schizophrenia—hallucinations, delusions, and cog-
nitive disorganization—are only transitory phenomena (Huber,
21I use the phrase “triggering events” when referring to post-onset psychotic
episodes. In contrast, I use the term “onset” when referring to untriggered
psychosis and the first psychotic episode.
22Bleuler’s idea of latent schizophrenia is coextensive with the DSM personal-
ity disorder “schizotypal disorder” (Kety, 1985).
1992) 23. Huber refers to cenesthetic schizophrenia as a variant
of latent schizophrenia suggesting “cenesthetic schizophrenia is
a schizophrenia that comes to a standstill at its very beginning
or develops into pure residual syndromes after one or a few
short psychotic episodes” (1992, p. 58). Cenesthetic schizophre-
nia is a good example of body phenomena in cases of mild
psychosis—obvious psychotic phenomena are transitory, disor-
ganized behavior is absent, and diagnosis is difficult due to the
brevity of psychotic episodes and the predominance of the resid-
ual phase. Interestingly, he echoes Bleuler’s claim that latent
schizophrenia is probably the most prevalent of all the forms of
psychosis.
However, the dominance of DSM focused psychiatry means
that these nuanced ideas of psychosis are being ignored and lost
in contemporary clinical practice.
The classical psychiatric ideas about psychosis have lost trac-
tion for several reasons. The success of the personality disorders,
particularly Cluster A and B types, has meant a movement
away from the category of mild psychosis. Thus, transitory psy-
chotic states and “unusual” individuals are more likely to be
diagnosed with borderline personality disorders and schizoid per-
sonality as opposed to psychosis. Changing classical psychiatric
ideas on psychosis to create new nosology has created a reduc-
tive model of psychosis in contemporary psychiatry. Although
the schizophrenia concept in DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric
Association, 2000) is derived from the classical psychiatric tra-
dition of Kraepelin and Bleuler (Sadock and Sadock, 2003) this
has been significantly altered and reduced in complexity. This
produces a simplistic picture of, and an impoverished clinical
engagement with, psychosis. Mullen observes that DSM-IV-TR
description of psychosis significantly different to the classical
psychiatric counterpart:
Bleuler required 95 separate psychopathological phenomena to
characterize the schizophrenias, Kraepelin in his final formula-
tion used 75, butDSM-IV-TR employs only 30. It is this truncated
psychopathology which forms the basis of virtually all character-
izations of schizophrenia in today’s scholarly literature (Mullen,
2007, p. 114).
Importantly, a reductive model has practical consequence. He
states that research surveying psychiatric diagnoses of schizophre-
nia, in terms of the total number of symptoms counted for
each diagnosis of schizophrenia made, shows an average of 4-5
symptoms used for diagnosis. In this sense, ordinary psychosis
provides an opportunity to broaden the category of psychosis,
in part, through returning to the classical psychiatric ideas on
psychosis. However, from a theoretical perspective ordinary psy-
chosis is centered on Lacan’s ideas on untriggered psychosis and
the suppletion.
In Lacan’s classical theory of psychosis, the idea of an untrig-
gered psychosis highlights the stabilizing function of the imag-
inary in psychotic structure. An untriggered psychosis, as the
23Cenesthesias were described well-before Huber (i.e., De Clérambault) but
his work has been central in attempts to create a diagnostic category for this
form of schizophrenia.
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name suggests, refers to a psychotic structure without onset.
Lacan claimed that in certain cases, imaginary identification may
prevent the onset of psychosis: identification with another person
provides the psychotic subject with a mechanism of imaginary
compensation (Lacan, 1993). He states that narcissistic relations
between individuals who share similar traits on the imaginary axis
constitute a “mechanism of imaginary compensation . . . for the
absent Oedipus complex, which would have given him virility in
the form, not of the paternal image, but of the signifier, the Name-
Of-The-Father” (Lacan, 1993, p. 192). For Lacan, the tendency for
imitation evident in narcissistic identification between individ-
uals constitutes a “mechanism of imaginary compensation” that
stabilizes the psychotic subject (2004, p. 192). He suggests that in
certain cases of schizophrenia, imaginary identification functions
to stave off psychotic decompensation and used the term, untrig-
gered psychosis, in such cases24. An untriggered psychosis may be
likened to a broken stool; although minus one leg, a three-legged
stool may still function to support a person depending on their
weight distribution. However, once the person’s weight is shifted
above the missing leg, it will collapse, person in tow. Similarly,
although imaginary identification functions to keep the person
“upright,” psychosis may be triggered, which leads to the collapse
of this supportive function.
In the field of ordinary psychosis, it has become clear
that imaginary identification can stabilize psychotic structure
subsequent to the onset of psychosis and triggering events.
Differentiating the onset of psychosis from subsequent trigger-
ing events is another important issue in the field of ordinary
psychosis. Clearly identifying the onset of psychosis, the first trig-
gering event, calls into question the utility of retaining the idea
of untriggered psychosis. Although the ideas of an untriggered
psychosis and ordinary psychosis both relate to cases of mild
psychosis, there is a significant difference between these posi-
tions. The idea of untriggered psychosis assumes that the onset
of psychosis has not occurred. In contrast, although a case of
ordinary psychosis may “look the same” as an untriggered psy-
chosis, the essential difference is that ordinary psychosis may be
post-onset. For example, an ordinary psychosis case character-
ized by acute psychosis and subsequent stabilization presented
by Ragland (Miller, 2009) demonstrated that despite the his-
tory of severe psychotic disturbances, periods of stability were
protracted and during these times the subject appeared rather
“normal.” The point here is that this case was considered an
example of ordinary psychosis (Miller, 2009). In contrast, others
claim (Brousse, 2009) that in order to preserve the idea of untrig-
gered psychosis, cases of ordinary psychosis need to be restricted
to instances of post-onset stabilisation. In doing so, the dis-
tinction between untriggered and post-onset psychosis is main-
tained. Consequently, despite some “phenomenological” similar-
ity between cases of untriggered psychosis and ordinary psychosis,
whether psychosis is pre- or post-onset remains a critical point of
distinction.
24Lacan’s theory of imaginary identification in cases of untriggered psychosis
was derived, in part, from Deutsch’s (1942) theory of the “as if” phenomena
observed in schizophrenia.
A problem with the idea of untriggered psychosis concerns the
uncertainty in clearly identifying the onset. The investigation of
the onset, particularly in milder forms of psychosis, supports the
idea that the effects of foreclosure are subtle, difficult to detect,
and will vary considerably between cases. As the case of Murielle
demonstrated, psychosis can be discreet, without schizophrenic
disorganization or a delusion. Although her symptoms emerged
at a specific point in time this episode did not constitute a severe
onset of psychotic symptoms and she was able to remain in high
school after these transient psychotic “episodes.” Thus, one of
the problems associated with the idea of an untriggered psy-
chosis is that it produces a propensity to focus on the “first time”
that a psychotic episode occurs with the concomitant expecta-
tion that a delusional construction will soon follow. While the
onset of psychosis is important clinically and attempts should
be made to clarify the genesis of psychosis, the onset is often
unverifiable.
For example, Stevens (2008) raises the issue of whether there
has been a clear onset of psychosis in a case featuring a man
with fibromyalgia 25. Stevens claims that the man was psychotic
and that the fibromyalgia constituted a symptom, as it had sev-
eral important functions for the subject: the illness provided a
proper name, a point of imaginary identification, and a way of
localizing invasive body jouissance. Although Stevens states that
the patient has an imaginary identification with Christ constitut-
ing a “delusion that doesn’t make too much noise” (2008, p. 65),
he is circumspect on whether there has been an onset of psy-
chosis. He asks, “Is the psychosis in this case triggered or not?”
And his answer is that “it is an academic question” (2008, p. 65
emphasis added). This response provides a good example of the
shift in emphasis evident in the approach to cases of psychosis. If
the onset of psychosis is not always discernible then “untriggered”
psychosis becomes an unreliable theory. Stevens response corre-
sponds with an emphasis on stabilization and suppletion rather
than on the idea of untriggered psychosis and the onset; the key
difference is that clinicians are now more interested in identify-
ing small effects of foreclosure indicative of a psychotic structure,
as well as the symptomatic responses that may be stabilizing psy-
chotic structure. One may conclude from this that the boundary
between an untriggered psychosis and a post-onset stabilized psy-
chosis has become “fuzzy.” Despite this, the idea of untriggered
psychosis has not become obsolete. On the contrary, clinical expe-
rience testifies to the idea that onset if often acute and emerges
without substantial warning or a prolonged “prodromal” phase.
Despite this, psychosis is, to use Miller’s phrase a “vast conti-
nent” and there are many instances where an obvious onset does
not occur.
Miller’s theory of ordinary psychosis is useful as both the onset
of psychosis and triggering events are linked to the more general
idea of stabilization and the suppletion. The compensatory make-
believe (CMB) Name-of-the-Father is central to his notion of
ordinary psychosis: it is ostensibly a supplementary device func-
tioning to cover the hole in the Other, which stabilizes psychic
structure. Here Miller states:
25Although this is not Stevens’ case, he provides a detailed description of the
patient’s history and symptomatology centered on the fibromyalgia.
www.frontiersin.org June 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 350 | 11
Redmond Lacanian theories of psychosis
For the first time, from a CMB situation to the opening of a hole,
and it goes on and on, you have a triggering. “Multiple breaks” is
when you have a repetitive pattern, and it’s compensated again and
again. We don’t say triggering. We say “triggered” when it happens
once (2009, p. 166 emphasis added).
The CMB Name-of-the-Father is important as it emphasizes
the continuity between triggering events and stabilization in psy-
chosis. Although the CMB Name-of-the-Father is also applicable
to the onset of psychosis and hence cases of untriggered psychosis,
its application is broader because it encompasses triggering events
and stabilization in psychosis, as well. Moreover, as mild cases
of psychosis may not exhibit an acute onset then other factors
need to be considered. For Miller (2009), a series of “small clues,”
referred as the small clues of foreclosure, can be useful for con-
ceptualizing mild psychosis. He suggests that subtle instances of
foreclosure may indicate “a disturbance to the inmost juncture
of the subject’s sense of life” (Miller, 2009, p. 154). This phrase,
derived from Lacan (1958), can orient the clinician to at least
three distinct areas of inquiry concerning the effects of foreclo-
sure: social relations, the body, and subjectivity. Of these, body
disturbances are particularly important, as they have been linked
to a restitution attempt.
Theorists in the field of ordinary psychosis claim that cer-
tain body phenomena in psychosis may have an important
stabilizing function. These body phenomena are different to
conversion symptoms in hysterical neurosis (Porcheret et al.,
2008) and classical hypochondriacal complaints in psychosis
(Laurent, 2006)26. They are particularly significant because the-
orists claim that in certain cases the onset of psychosis is followed
by body phenomena that function to stabilize psychosis. While
Lacan’s theorization of paranoia is both highly instructive and
indispensable to clinicians working with psychosis, theorists have
over emphasized the classical theory of psychosis concerning the
onset of psychosis and stabilization. In contrast, theorists sup-
porting the idea of ordinary psychosis claim that restitution via
symptom formation, as opposed to imaginary identification, is
not limited to the formation of a delusion; but rather, a body
symptom may effectively short-circuit the trajectory of psychosis
described in the schizophrenia/paranoia dichotomy (Gault, 2004;
Laurent, 2006; Porcheret et al., 2008)27. Theorists claim that for
some individuals, a part of the body, experienced as painful, can
become a symptom with a restitutive function.
One issue central to the field of ordinary psychosis is the
claim that body symptoms can have a restitutive function in
psychosis. If one accepts the idea that certain body phenomena
have a restitutive function then theorizing how the mechanisms
26As Gault states,
the subjects’ efforts to defend themselves against the real had brought
them to elect a part of their body as painful and to attempt to
raise this pain to the status of a symptom addressed to an ana-
lyst. Although these were phenomena related purely to the signifier’s
effect on the body as a living organism, these “neo-conversions” do
not, in our opinion, belong to the register of the hysterical structure
(2008, p. 2).
27Lacan’s classical theory of psychosis refers to the essays and seminars in the
1950’ s where the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father was first introduced
(1958, 1993).
of foreclosure and symptomatisation operate in these instances
remains to be addressed. Miller’s term for suppletion, the CMB
Name-of-the-Father, addresses this problem. Two aspects of his
argument that support the idea of the CMB Name-of-the-Father
are worth noting; the first relates to catatonia and the second
concerns the neurosis/psychosis distinction.
Miller’s explicit reference to catatonia supports the idea of a
supplementary device in psychosis. Catatonia is considered to be
the most severe manifestation of psychosis (Cottet, 2000; Declerq,
2004) as it is characterized by radical social withdrawal, body
disorganization, and the loss of cognitive functions: in short cata-
tonia indicates the collapse of psychic reality. He (2009) states
that if the psychotic subject is not in a state of complete cata-
tonia, then we must assume the existence of a mechanism of
suppletion that has a compensatory function. This reasoning is
fundamental to understanding cases of ordinary psychosis; the
entire notion of stabilization in psychosis is, in a sense, premised
on the kinds of catastrophic states evident in severe catatonia
being possible in a psychotic structure, regardless of whether an
individual ever experiences this kind of acute disturbance28. On
the one hand, symptom severity is utilized in viewing catatonia as
the most severe manifestation of schizophrenia; on the other, this
“phenomenological” perspective is augmented by the claim that
catatonia is characterized by the collapse of psychic reality due to
the absence of a supplementary device. The absence of a supple-
mentary device is catastrophic as the real remains unmediated by
either the imaginary or the symbolic. The contrast between the
severity of catatonic states and cases of ordinary psychosis high-
lights the variability of symptoms in psychotic structure: cases of
ordinary psychosis demonstrate that sustaining psychic reality is
possible in a psychotic structure even though the Name-of-the-
Father is foreclosed. Miller’s reference to symptom severity in
catatonia constitutes a position from which the supplementary
functions of the Name-of-the-Father may be developed. Thus,
the second point concerning the neurosis/psychosis distinction
follows on from this.
Miller (2006, 2009) is adamant that in order to understand
ordinary psychosis, the functions of the Name-of-the-Father, as
elaborated in neurosis, remain an important reference point for
theorizing stabilization in psychosis. The CMB Name-of-the-
Father aims to show how the psychotic subject has access to
certain functions of the Name-of-the-Father even if this signi-
fier is foreclosed. Throughout Lacan’s teachings, the theory of
the Name-of-the-Father became increasingly complex as more
functions were attributed to it. Stevens (2007) description of
the functions of the Name-of-the-Father in a neurotic structure
provides a useful starting point for exploring this issue:
One needs “the Father who says no” as in “no smoking” i.e., the
interdictor. This is the father who enforces a prohibition. This is
the symbolic dimension of the father. However, if the father limits
28Again, the importance of Lacan’s unitary theory of psychosis cannot be
underestimated because different variants of psychosis are assumed to share
the same fundamental mechanism, and continuity between these different
forms will be evident in many cases. However, determining the different
mechanisms operating in diverging forms of psychosis such as schizophrenia,
paranoia and melancholy, remains an important theoretical task.
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himself to this capacity. . . then it is primarily the imaginary aspect
of the father that is present. The primacy of the imaginary register
yields a specific aspect of enjoyment. It is jouissance of the body.
One also needs “the Father who says yes.” This enabling dimen-
sion makes it possible for the subject to affirm his singularity and
subsequently find his own way in the world. This is the father who
makes it possible for the child to choose his own ideals. Finally, one
also needs the inscription of a name, a unique name appropriate
to the singularity of the subject. Thus, the Name-of-the-Father is
also the transmission of the name. It is the symbolic inscription of
the generations (p. 11).
These three functions of the Name-of-the-Father—castration,
social identification, and naming—are associated with the reduc-
tion or tempering of jouissance. Thus, when working with the
neurotic subject the Name-of-the-Father is deduced, in part, by
observing its pacification effects; one clear indication of a neu-
rotic structure is a limit to the “quantity” of jouissance (Miller,
2009). The neurotic subject’s access to jouissance is limited by the
cut of castration: in one sense, desire is a defense against jouis-
sance. Lacan’s statement that “castration means that jouissance
has to be refused in order to be attained on the inverse scale of the
Law of desire" (1966, p. 324) can be read in this light.
In psychosis, however, this limit to jouissance is not achieved
via castration due the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father.
Therefore, without these pacification effects of castration, jouis-
sance may be invasive, delocalized and overwhelming. If “psy-
chosis is essentially a disorder in the field of jouissance” ((Declerq,
2002), p. 102) then this occurs because there is no bar marking
a limit to the subject’s access to jouissance. Yet, despite the psy-
chotic subject not having access to castration, pacification effects
that would otherwise be linked to the Name-of-the-Father can
be observed. The fact that pacifying effects are evident in cases
of ordinary psychosis prompts the question of how stabiliza-
tion occurs without the mechanism of castration. Consequently,
mild forms of psychosis raises the question of how stabiliza-
tion is possible. Miller’s response is to ask: what functions of the
Name-of-the-Father are evident in a supplementary device?
Miller’s idea of the CMBName-of-the-Father and its functions
has continuity with Lacan’s seminar on Joyce. The CMBName-of-
the-Father is an extension of (Lacan, 1975–1976) statement, made
during the seminar on Joyce that one can do without the Name-of-
the-Father provided it is put to use. On the one hand, the CMB
Name-the-Father brings together the three distinct forms of sup-
pletion in Lacan’s theory of psychosis—imaginary identification,
the delusion, and the sinthome; on the other, it is also emphasizes
the importance of the sinthome in Lacan’s later teachings. When
surveying the literature on ordinary psychosis, it is clear that the
emphasis on stabilization centers on imaginary identification and
the sinthome. The vignette featuring Murielle leans toward the
sinthome. Deffieux theorizes the case in terms of metonymy; that
is, he traces how the emergence of a symptom was connected
to the signifier “water” and the corporeal boundary delineated
by the corset. According to Deffieux, symptoms can be tracked
via how the signifier, water, is displaced into other signifiers that
extract and localize body jouissance. The movement from water
cleansing rituals through to the use of hydrating cream shows
a mobility of jouissance and its gradual localization, which in
turn, correlates with the disappearance of the invasive body pains.
This process of displacement ormetonymy appears quite different
from Freud’s description of “formations of the unconscious” in
neurosis. That is, it is possible to assume that there is not repressed
signifier underlying the movement of signifiers29. Moreover, the
displacement does not occur in a delusional system. Deffieux’s
description highlights a decrease in painful body jouissance as a
symptom coalesces around a series of signifiers linked to a bathing
ritual that seems to reestablish corporeal unity. He also comments
that her decision to join a group played an important social identi-
fication for her to create andmaintain a group link. This last point
is significant as the psychotic subject’s difficulty creating and sus-
taining social links is a well-known feature of psychosis (i.e.,
anomie) and central to Lacan’s claim that the psychotic subject
is “outside” of discourse.
Frommy perspective, this case is useful in highlighting impor-
tant aspects of ordinary psychosis. First, the case foregrounds a
series of issues central to ordinary psychosis—triggering, mild
psychosis, body disturbances and stabilization. As I have shown,
while Verhaeghe’s discussion of psychosis and actualpathol-
ogy emphasizes similar themes, his reliance on the schizophre-
nia/paranoia dichotomy means that these issues are theorized
primarily within the paranoia spectrum of psychosis. In con-
trast, as the vignette demonstrates the restitutive function of
the sinthome in psychosis—without the delusional metaphor—
then it requires a different response. The case is instructive in
foregrounding core debates in the field of ordinary psychosis. A
central problem, namely, how a sinthome can emerge to localize
jouissance, remains to be sufficiently elaborated. Two aspects of
the sinthome - the localisation of jouissance and social identifica-
tion - are the focal point of investigation. In the case vignette, the
emergence of a symptom is linked to Murielle’s water cleansing
“rituals” involving the body; this demonstrates that pacification
effects associated with the Name-of-the-Father need to be theo-
rized in conjunction with the signifier though in a manner that
moves beyond the idea of the delusional metaphor. Moreover,
the case also demonstrates how social identifications are central
to understanding recovery in psychosis which supports the claim
that “the sinthome is nothing other than the social bond for the
29For example, in Studies on hysteria (1893–1895) the case of Fräulein
Elizabeth von R. shows how a conflict concerning the emergence of erotic
ideas was pivotal in the development of conversion symptoms. In this partic-
ular case, Freud states that Elizabeth’s conversion symptom—a localized pain
to her right upper thigh—first developed when
the circle of ideas embracing her duties to her sick father came into
conflict with the content of the erotic desire she was feeling at the time.
Under pressure of lively self-reproaches she decided in favor of the for-
mer, and in doing so brought about her hysterical pain (1893–1895,
p. 164).
Localization of the hysterical conversion symptom to her right thigh correlates
with the place her father would rest his foot when Elizabeth was bandaging his
ankle during his convalescence; thesememories provided the “content” for the
dissimulation of erotic wishes via the construction of a symptom (Freud and
Breuer, 1893–1895). Although this is only a small segment of this case, the
point is that the hysterical conversion symptom emerged due to repression; in
this case, repression functioned as a defense against acknowledging ideas that
created psychical conflict.
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subject” (Svolos, 2009, p. 3). Hence, Murielle creates a social link
via participation with a writing group in the treatment facility.
Deffieux indicates although the formation of a symptom corre-
lated with the dissipation of painful hypochondriacal symptoms,
it was the social identifications that facilitated a social link and it
was this that lifted the negative symptoms. In summary, theoriz-
ing symptomatisation in psychosis beyond the scope of the delu-
sional metaphor - which Deffieux does by focusing exclusively
on metonymy - may shed light on cases where body phenomena
and the signifier coalesce to create a stabilizing symptom in the
subject’s psychic economy.
CONCLUSION
In contemporary Lacanian psychoanalysis, Verhaeghe’s theory
of psychosis and the Millerian field of ordinary psychosis pro-
vide distinct approaches to psychosis. Verhaeghe’s theory, derived
from Freud’s idea of actual neurosis, psychoanalytic attach-
ment theory and Lacan’s notion of psychotic structure, engage
a range of psychotic presentations in the schizophrenia/paranoia
dichotomy. His theory of actualpathology in psychosis, which is
characterized by the absence of positive/negative symptoms and
the presence of subtle body disturbances is useful as it under-
scores the complex symptomatology of psychosis, an idea that is
alarmingly absent in contemporary psychiatric discourse. Despite
this utility, his theory of psychosis has several limitations. For
example, distinguishing between the ideas of deviant mirroring
styles and the mechanism of foreclosure in his description of drive
disregulation remains difficult. In addition, Verhaeghe’s discus-
sion of compensatory mechanisms is too narrow as his treatment
approach to psychosis recapitulates the schizophrenia/paranoia
dichotomy. His approach to actualpathology in psychosis, where
the analyst aims to modify body disturbances through the con-
struction of symptoms and the emergence of secondary defenses,
is essentially an attempt to transform schizophrenia into para-
noia through the construction of a delusion. As such, there is
insufficient attention given to the variety of compensatory mech-
anisms that may operate in psychosis. In contrast, the Millerian
field of ordinary psychosis may provide a more useful approach
to questions of stabilization in psychosis. It affirms the existence
of a broad range of (often subtle) psychotic phenomena and
supposes that an array of compensatory mechanisms can stabi-
lize psychosis. By drawing extensively on Lacan’s later teachings,
theorists in the field of ordinary psychosis have begun to refor-
mulate Freud’s thesis of loss and restitution in psychosis beyond
the construction of a delusion by supposing that a symptom with
a stabilizing function may emerge in a variety of forms. While
this focus on stabilization and compensatory mechanisms in psy-
chotic structure is under-theorized, it does provide a useful theory
for reviving the idea of mild psychosis. In summary, the field
of ordinary psychosis, in broadening the category of psychosis
and through placing greater emphasis on the idea of untriggered
psychosis and the sinthome, has greater utility than Verhaeghe’s
theory of psychosis, which remains anchored in the narrower
schizophrenia/paranoia dichotomy.
REFERENCES
Aisemberg, P., and Aisenstein, M.
(2004). Theoretical approaches to
somatic conditions: work at the
frontiers or psychoanalytic work.
Int. J. Psychoanal. 85, 977–981.
American Psychiatric Association.
(2000). Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders,
4th Edn. (DSM-IV-TR).
Washington, DC: American
Psychiatric Association. doi:
10.1016/S0140-6736(06)69865-6
Bateman, A., and Fonagy, P. (2004).
Mentalization-based treatment of
BPD. J. Pers. Disord. 18, 36–51. doi:
10.1057/9780230355873
Bateman, A., and Fonagy, P. (2006).
Treatment of borderline person-
ality disorder with psychoanalyti-
cally oriented partial hospitaliza-
tion: an 18-month follow-up. Am. J.
Psychiatry 4, 244–252.
Berrios, G., and Beer, D. (1994). The
notion of unitary psychosis: a con-
ceptual history. Hist. Psychiatry 5,
13–36.
Brousse, M.-H. (2009). Ordinary psy-
choses in the light of Lacan’s theory
of discourse. Psychoanal. Notebooks
Eur. Sch. Psychoanal. 19, 7–20.
Cottet, S. (2000). Four preliminary
questions to a renewal of the clinic
(Trans. R. Klein). Psychoanal.
Notebooks 4, 65. Available online
at: http://www.londonsociety-nls.
org.uk/
Declerq, F. (2002). The real of the
body in Lacanian theory. Analysis
11, 98–114.
Declerq, F. (2004). Lacan’s concept
of the real of jouissance: clini-
cal illustrations and implications.
Psychoanal. Cult. Soc. 9, 237–251.
Deffieux, J.-P. (2000). The use of
metonymy in a case of psychosis.
Psychoanal. Notebooks Eur. Sch.
Psychoanal. 4, 147–158.
Deutsch, H. (1942). Some forms of
emotional disturbance and their
relationship to schizophrenia.
Psychoanal. Q. 11, 301–321.
Dor, J. (1997). The Clinical Lacan.
(S. Fairfield, Trans.). Northvale, NJ:
Jason Aronson.
Fink, B. (1997). A Clinical Introduction
to Lacanian Psychoanalysis: Theory
and Technique. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Fonagy, P., Gergely, G., Jurist, E., and
Target, M. (2002). Affect Regulation,
Mentalization, and the Development
of the Self. New York, NY: Other
Press.
Fonagy, P., Target, M., Gergely, G.,
Allen, J. G., and Bateman, A. W.
(2003). The developmental roots
of borderline personality disorder
in early attachment relationships.
Psychoanal. Inq. 23, 412–459.
Freud, S. (1893). “Draft B: the aetiology
of the neuroses,” in The Standard
Edition of the Complete Psychological
Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. I,
ed J. Strachey (Trans.), (London:
Hogarth Press), 179–184.
Freud, S. (1894). “The neuro-psychoses
of defense,” in The Standard Edition
of the Complete Psychological Works
of Sigmund Freud, Vol. III, ed
J. Strachey (Trans.), (London:
Hogarth Press), 43–70.
Freud, S. (1905). “Three essays on
the theory of sexuality,” in The
Standard Edition of the Complete
Psychological Works of Sigmund
Freud, Vol. VII, ed J. Strachey
(Trans.), (London: Hogarth Press),
123–246.
Freud, S. (1911). “Psycho-analytic
notes on an autobiographical
account of a case of paranoia,”
in The Standard Edition of the
Complete Psychological Works
of Sigmund Freud, Vol. X, ed
J. Strachey (Trans.), (London:
Hogarth Press), 3–32.
Freud, S. (1916). “Introductory lec-
tures on psycho-analysis (part
III),” in The Standard Edition of
the Complete Psychological Works
of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XVI, ed J.
Strachey (Trans.), (London: The
Hogarth Press) 243–483.
Freud, S. (1917). “Introductory lec-
tures on psycho-analysis (part
III),” in The Standard Edition of
the Complete Psychological Works
of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XVI, ed J.
Strachey (Trans.), (London: The
Hogarth Press) 243–483.
Freud, S. (1918). “An infantile neurosis
and other works,” in The Standard
Edition of the Complete Psychological
Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XVII,
ed J. Strachey (Trans.), (London:
Hogarth Press), 7–124.
Freud, S., and Breuer, J. (1893–1895).
“Studies on hysteria,” in The
Standard Edition of the Complete
Psychological Works of Sigmund
Freud, Vol. II, ed J. Strachey
(Trans.), (London: Hogarth Press,
1957), 1–312.
Gault, J.-L. (2004). The man with
a hundred thousand hairs.
Psychoanal. Notebooks 12, 93–97.
Grasser, F. (1998). Stabilizations in
Psychosis (J. Stone, Trans.). Available
online at: http://web.missouri.edu/
~stonej/t67894312xxxv.html
Grigg, R. (2011). Treating theWolfMan
as a case of ordinary psychosis. Cult.
Clin. 1, 78–88.
Hriso, P. (2002). Mental Automatisms:
A Conceptual Journey into Psychosis.
Frontiers in Psychology | Psychoanalysis and Neuropsychoanalysis June 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 350 | 14
Redmond Lacanian theories of psychosis
Bayonne, NJ: Hermes Whispers
Press.
Huber, G. (1992). Cenesthetic
schizophrenia - a subtype of
schizoprhenia disease. Neurol.
Psychiatry Brain Res. 1, 54–60.
Kety, S. (1985). Schizotypal person-
ality disorder. Schizophr. Bull. 11,
590–594.
Lacan, J. (1953). “Response to Jean
Hyppolite’s commentary on Freud’s
“Verneinung” (B. Fink, Trans.),” in
Écrits: The First Complete Edition in
English, ed J.-A. Miller (New York,
NY: W. W. Norton and Company),
318–333.
Lacan, J. (1958). “On a question
prior to any possible treatment
of psychosis (B. Fink, Trans.),” in
Écrits: The First Complete Edition in
English, ed J.-A. Miller (New York,
NY: W. W. Norton and Company),
445–488.
Lacan, J. (1966). “The subversion of
the subject and the dialectic of
desire in the Freudian unconscious
(B. Fink, Trans.),” in Écrits: The
First Complete Edition in English,
ed J. A. Miller (New York, NY:
W. W. Norton and Company),
671–702.
Lacan, J. (1975–1976). Le sémi-
naire 1975–1976, Livre XXIII, Le
Sinthome. Paris: Seuil.
Lacan, J. (1993). “The psychoses
(R. Grigg, Trans.),” in The
Seminar of Jacques Lacan 1954-
55, Book III, ed J.-A. Miller (New
York, NY: W. W. Norton and
Company).
Laplanche, J., and Pontalis, J. B. (1973).
The Language of Psycho-Analysis
(D. Nicholson-Smith, Trans.). New
York, NY: W. W. Norton and
Company.
Laurent, E. (2006). “Ordinary psy-
chosis,” in Paper presented at the
Instituto do Campo Freudiano de
Buenos Aires (Trans. D. Otero),
(Buenos Aires)
Maleval, J.-C. (2000). Why so many
‘bordelines’? Psychoanal. Notebooks
Eur. Sch. Psychoanal. 4, 111–127.
McDougall, J., and Coen, S. J. (2000).
Affect, somatisation and symbolisa-
tion. Int. J. Psychoanal. 81, 159–161.
Meisser, W. W. (1981). The
schizophrenic and the paranoid
process. Schizophr. Bull. 7, 611–631.
Miller, J.-A. (2006). The names-of-the-
father (B. Fulks, Trans.). Lacanian
Ink 27, 64–79.
Miller, J.-A. (2009). Ordinary psychosis
revisited. Psychoanal. Notebooks Eur.
Sch. Psychoanal. 19, 139–168.
Mullen, P. (2007). A modest pro-
posal for another phenomenolog-
ical approach to psychopathology.
Schizophr. Bull. 33, 113–121. doi:
10.1093/schbul/sbl043
Porcheret, B., Cassin, R., Guéguen,
P.-G., and Sauvagnat, F. (2008).
“Corporeal phenomena in male
patients,” in Paper presented at
the Paris English Seminar: Ordinary
Psychosis, (Paris).
Sadock, B., and Sadock, V. (2003).
Synopsis of Psychiatry: Behavioral
Sciences/Clinical Psychiatry.
Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott
Williams and Wilkins.
Sauvagnat, F. (2000). On the specificity
of psychotic elementary phenom-
ena. Psychoanal. Notebooks Eur. Sch.
Psychoanal. 1, 95–110.
Sauvagnat, F. (2005). Psychotic anxiety
and its correlate in bodily experi-
ence: some remarks on ‘new symp-
toms’. Psychoanal. Notebooks Eur.
Sch. Psychoanal. 14, 53–59.
Stanghellini, G. (2009). Embodiment
and schizophrenia.World Psychiatry
1, 56–59.
Stevens, A. (2007). Psychosis and the
paternal function: can one choose
one’s Father. Lacanian Compass 1,
4–14.
Stevens, A. (2008). Mono-symptoms
and hints of ordinary psychosis.
Psychoanal. Notebooks Eur. Sch.
Psychoanal. 19, 57–67.
Svolos, T. (2008). “Psychic suffering
and the treatment challenges of the
postmodern world,” in Paper pre-
sented at the Paris English Seminar:
Ordinary Psychosis, (Paris).
Svolos, T. (2009). Ordinary psychosis in
the era of the sinthome and sem-
blant. Psychoanal. Notebooks Eur.
Sch. Psychoanal. 19, 79–84.
Taylor, G. (2003). Somatization and
conversion: distinct or overlapping
constructs. J. Am. Acad. Psychoanal.
31, 487–501.
Tyrer, P., and Baldwin, D. (2006).
Generalized anxiety disorder. Lancet
368, 2156–2166.
Vanheule, S. (2011). The Subject of
Psychosis: a Lacanian Perspective.
London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Verhaeghe, P. (2004). On Being Normal
and Other Disorders: A Manual
for Clinical Psychodiagnostics. New
York, NY: Other Press.
Verhaeghe, P. (2007). “Chronicle
of a death foretold: the end of
psychotherapy,” in Paper pre-
sented at the Thinking, Feeling,
Being: Critical Perspectives
and Creative Engagement in
Psychosocial Health. Proceedings
from Health4Life Conference, 2007,
University of Dublin (Dublin).
Available online at: http://
www.dcu.ie/health4life/conferences/
2007/resources/Health4Life2007_Ke
ynote_Paul_Verhaeghe.pdf
Verhaeghe, P. (2011). Psychoanalysis
in times of science: an interview
with Paul Verhaeghe. S: J. Jan Van
Eyck Circle Lacanian Ideal. Crit. 4,
11–23.
Verhaeghe, P., Vanheule, S., and De
Rick, A. (2007). Actual neurosis as
the underlying psychic structure of
panic disorder, somatization, and
somatoform disorder: an integra-
tion of Freudian and attachment
perspectives. Psychoanal. Q. 76,
1317–1350.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
author declares that the research
was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships
that could be construed as a potential
conflict of interest.
Received: 03 April 2013; paper pend-
ing published: 16 April 2013; accepted:
29 May 2013; published online: 28 June
2013.
Citation: Redmond JD (2013)
Contemporary perspectives on Lacanian
theories of psychosis. Front. Psychol.
4:350. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00350
This article was submitted to
Frontiers in Psychoanalysis and
Neuropsychoanalysis, a specialty of
Frontiers in Psychology.
Copyright © 2013 Redmond. This is
an open-access article distributed under
the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License, which permits use,
distribution and reproduction in other
forums, provided the original authors
and source are credited and subject to any
copyright notices concerning any third-
party graphics etc.
www.frontiersin.org June 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 350 | 15
